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 Abstract  
The non-identity problem attempts to explain the moral permissibility of 
certain procreative acts that determine a future individual’s existence. If we accept 
that this individual’s life is worth living, than we must also accept that these 
procreative acts are permissible. However, this is not the case. In this paper, I will 
argue against the permissibility of these acts and explain why our intuition, that these 
acts are morally wrong, is in fact correct. Because the non-identity problem affects 
particular persons, those whose existence is brought about, I argue in favor of a 
solution that explains that moral impermissibility in terms of the wrong done to this 
particular person. I do so by demonstrating why solutions offered by Derek Parfit, 
Elizabeth Harman, and Justin McBrayer have failed, whereas solutions offered by 
James Woodward and Gregory Kavka successfully explain moral impermissibility of 
non-identity acts in terms of wronging future individuals.  
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Chapter 1: The Non-Identity Problem and Why We Should Care About It 
 
Introduction: 
        Whoever exists in the future depends on the actions of those who currently 
exist. Whether or not a particular person is born depends on who conceives them, and 
when they are conceived. If my mother had a child with someone besides my father, I 
would not exist because a different sperm and egg would have combined creating 
another child who would not be identical to me (Parfit, 352). The non-identity 
problem considers the obligations we may have to persons whose existences are 
dependent on our actions, when their existences are contingent upon some act that 
seems to harm them. In these cases, a person’s worthwhile existence is dependent on 
the actions that caused whatever apparent flaw there may be in that existence. 
Therefore, the only alternatives are to not have that child, or to have a non-identical 
child at a different time (Parfit, 359). Here is where the non-identity problem arises. 
We have procreative acts that seem to have harmed someone by setting their interests 
back and therefore intuitively, it seems that these acts should be deemed 
impermissible, but the very existence of the person, an existence which is worthwhile, 
was dependent on that act. Because this existence is worthwhile, not doing the act that 
produced the harm doesn’t seem to be acting in the person’s interests because if the 
act that seems to have been harmful had not occurred, a different, non-identical child 
would exist. Therefore, we run into the problem, or as Kavka refers to it, the paradox 
of future individuals, of how we can explain the apparent harm done to these 
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individuals and why these seemingly harmful acts are impermissible (Parfit, 359). 
Gregory Kavka refers to this as the paradox of future individuals because we follow 
logical premises based on biology and personal identity to a conclusion that is 
counterintuitive. We seem to be in a moral position where is very little which our 
obligation to future individuals demands of us (Kavka, 95). 
 
Where We See the Non-identity Problem Arise 
        At first glance, it can seem difficult to understand why we should be so 
concerned about the non-identity problem, so we should consider tangible, real-world 
situations that demonstrate the relevance of the problem. First, historically, we can 
see the way in which policies or decisions have affected the movement of people 
which leads to procreative acts playing out in ways that could have been different had 
those policies or decisions been different. First, consider how we see the non-identity 
problem reflected in World War Two. The actions of the Nazi’s not only led to 
millions of deaths, but also led to people fleeing Nazi Germany and other occupied 
areas. This movement of people likely affected who people met and who they 
procreated with. Now, say a person is conceived by someone who met their partner in 
the United States, where they ended up because they were fleeing the terror of the 
Nazi’s. Their child has a life which he considers worth living and had his parent not 
fled to the United States, they would have procreated with a different person and had 
a non-identical child. 
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        The non-identity problem also arises in the modern day, very relevant issue of 
global warming. This is a perfect example of the way in which the policies that we 
implement affect future generations. If we continue on the path we are on, the earth 
will likely continue getting warmer which will negatively impact future generations. 
We could continue practices which hurt our environment, but make our lives more 
convenient and rest on the assumption that those who exist in the future will have 
lives that are at least barely worth living. Alternatively, we could implement policies 
which defer the effects of global warming and cause a group of people to exist in the 
future who would be non-identical to the group that would have existed had we not 
implemented those policies, due to the way in which policy can affect the movement 
of people based on employment or housing availability. Those who will exist should 
we refrain from this change will not benefit in any way from our decision to do so 
because they will not exist in the latter scenario. Regardless, it seems intuitively true 
that to develop policies which will defer the effects of global warming, even if the 
people who exist otherwise will not be benefited in any way by this decision, is the 
proper course. The driving course behind this intuition motivates the non-identity 
problem in a way that we can see affects our lives perhaps more immediately than 
some examples which will be offered later. 
        Besides those examples which we see in our everyday life, philosophers who 
have addressed the non-identity problem have provided examples which more clearly 
demonstrate how the non-identity problem seems so problematic. First, consider 
Derek Parfit’s radioactive waste policy example which involves a choice between two 
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policies: one policy, the Risky Policy, will eventually lead to a buildup of radioactive 
waste and will cause future people to die at 40 from an incurable disease caused by 
the radiation, however until that time, their lives will be worthwhile. Alternatively, 
the Safe Policy will stop this buildup of radioactive waste and future people will 
suffer not suffer this disease directly caused by the radioactive waste (Parfit, 372). 
Due to the nature of policy change, whichever policy we implement will affect 
people’s lives including where they move to, who they meet, and when and if they 
conceive children. The respective groups of people who will exist, depending on the 
policy we choose, will not be identical to each other. Therefore, we do not harm the 
group of people who will exist if we choose the Risky Policy because we have not set 
their interests back at all. Nor do we help them at all by choosing the Safe Policy 
because if we do so, a completely different group of people will exist. Because of 
these implications, it does not seem that we have a reason to choose the Safe Policy 
for the sake of future people if we will not harm or benefit future people either way. 
        Parfit also considers a fourteen-year old girl who wants to have a child 
immediately. She has the option of waiting ten years and having a child once she is 
older and more capable of caring for the child. However, if she waits, the egg that 
would have been used during conception of a child at fourteen will no longer be 
available, and she will conceive a non-identical child with a different sperm and egg. 
The fourteen-year-old decides not to wait and has a child and the child’s life is at least 
barely worth living (Parfit, 358). The problem in this scenario is that our intuition 
tells us that for the fourteen-year-old to conceive now would be wrong, wrong to the 
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child, but if the mother does not conceive now she will have a non-identical child. 
Therefore, the mother waiting to conceive the child does not help the child whom we 
thought was being wronged by her actions. 
        Finally, Gregory Kavka considers parents who enter into a contract with a 
wealthy man to conceive a child. The parents will conceive the child, and upon its 
birth, they will give the child to the wealthy man to have as his slave in exchange for 
50,000 dollars. If not for the contract and the monetary incentive, the parents had not 
planned on having a child. They sign the contract, conceive the child, and give the 
child to the wealthy man and the child lives out her life as his slave, however it is still 
a life at least barely worth living (Kavka, 100). If not for the contract, the child would 
not have been born. 
        In each of these examples, our intuition is clear: The Safe Policy should be 
chosen over the Risky Policy, the fourteen-year-old girl should not have a child, and 
the parents should not enter into the contract. However, in each of these cases, none 
of the people who seem to have been harmed are any worse off than they would have 
otherwise been. A person can be made worse off by having their interests set back or 
completely thwarted (McBrayer, 302). However, in each of these types of non-
identity cases, none of the children’s interests have been set back because their 
worthwhile existence is contingent upon the act that caused the apparent harm and 
their existence is, by definition, worth it. The group of people who exist if we chose 
the Risky Policy were only ever going to exist if that policy was chosen and if the 
radioactive waste was there to cause their painful diseases. The child that the girl has 
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at fourteen would not have been born had the fourteen-year-old girl waited ten years. 
The slave child would not have been born had her parents not entered into the 
contract that signed her away into slavery. Each child in these non-identity cases is no 
worse off than they would have otherwise been because each of their lives is at least 
barely worth living compared to non-existence. However, it seems intuitively as if 
they are somehow harmed, so we must figure out where that intuition comes from. 
In this paper, I will consider some classic approaches to solving the non-
identity problem and where they fail. I will then evaluate two approaches which are 
more successful and consider how they would help us address the aforementioned 
scenarios. Finally, I will argue in favor of my own approach to the non-identity 
problem, by considering where other solutions have failed or have been successful. 
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Chapter 2: What the Scope of a Solution Requires and Why Certain Solutions Fail to 
Solve the Non- Identity Problem 
 
The Scope of a Solution to the Non-Identity Problem         
        The arguments which I will first address will be those that I believe have 
failed to solve the non-identity problem. Although I will address how each has failed 
on its own terms, I also believe that they all have failed because of a common 
theoretical foundation of their solution. Each of the solutions I will reject is either an 
impersonal or a wide-person affecting solution. On an impersonal account, we are 
aiming for the best state of affairs foreseeable. Creating persons who will exist only 
in these apparently harmful conditions is wrong because we have duty to minimize 
the amount of suffering in the world (McBrayer, 300). According to a wide- person 
affecting view, we should follow the principle which is best for future people in 
general, regardless of particular identities. This means that we should follow the 
principle which will lead to the best circumstances for whoever will exist. Therefore, 
in non-identity cases, we consider the two persons who could exist, and choose to 
have the person who will be better off exist (Weinberg, 2016, 118). For example, in 
the radioactive waste policy example, the two groups of future people who exist are 
non-identical, so regardless of identity, we must choose whichever policy will lead 
the group who will exist to be better off. The group of people who will exist if we 
choose the Safe Policy will have better circumstances than the group which will exist 
if we choose the risky policy will have. 
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        The problem with these types of solutions, whether they are based on either an 
impersonal or a wide-person affecting theory, is that they do not solve the non-
identity problem, they speak past it. This is because the non-identity problem is a 
narrow-person affecting problem. Consider each of the scenarios I brought up. Each 
of those parents’ and policy makers’ acts seems to be wrong because they wronged 
some particular person. In the radioactive waste policy, choosing the Risky Policy 
seems wrong because that particular group of people who will exist will live with the 
harmful repercussions of the policy. They are not intuitively impermissible simply 
because some other group of people could have been better off or because we could 
have had a better state of affairs. They are wrong in virtue of the wrong that they have 
done to some particular person or group of people. There appears to be some wrong 
done to a particular person and that is where the problematic aspect of the non-
identity problem comes into play: if that particular person could only have ever 
existed with that apparent harm, then how do we explain why or if the act that led to 
their existence is impermissible. Clearly, if we are going to solve the non-identity 
problem, we should be in search of a solution which is narrow-person-affecting. 
Because none of the following solutions are narrow-person affecting, they avoid the 
non-identity problem, rather than actually solving it, as a narrow-person affecting 
solution should. 
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Derek Parfit and Principle Q: 
        In addressing the non-identity problem, Parfit considers the threshold a 
procreative act must cross for it to be considered to have harmed someone to be that 
the act sets the interests of the person who comes into existence back to the point that 
their life is not worth living. The minimal threshold Parfit sets for a life worth living 
is that the life is at least barely worth living (Parfit, 363). A life that is not worth 
living is considered a harm. Otherwise, so long as someone’s life is at least barely 
worth living, Parfit considers existence within that standard to be no worse than the 
alternative of non-existence. 
        Parfit’s proposed solution to same number cases of the non-identity problem 
involves a principle he refers to as, Principle Q (Parfit 378). Principle Q states that if 
the same number of people will live regardless of which act we choose to do, it would 
be bad if those who do live have a lower quality of life than the people who could 
have lived instead (Parfit, 378). Parfit concedes that Principle Q is only able to 
addresses cases in which there are the same number of people however, and he goes 
on to argue that to solve the non-identity problem requires a broader principle which 
can answer scenarios where there are a different number of people. For example, 
Principle Q cannot tell us why the actions of the parents in the slave contract scenario 
are impermissible. In that case we either have one child or no children. However, for 
now, Parfit proposes Principle Q as a solution to same number cases, so this is the 
solution to which I will respond. 
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        The most obvious problem with Principle Q is that it can only be applied in 
cases where the same number of people will exist. Beyond that limitation, Principle Q 
also faces the problem that it is a wide-person-affecting solution attempting to answer 
a narrow-person-affecting problem. This is a problem for Principle Q’s plausibility as 
a solution for the reasons against wide-person affecting-solutions which I addressed 
in the section of this chapter, The Scope of a Solution to the Non-Identity Problem. 
        Another objection to Parfit’s reasoning is that he neglects to consider that 
persons have interests other than how well off they are after a particular act 
(Woodward, 809). There is a difference between harming someone and wronging 
them, and the moral impermissibility of the types of acts which give rise to the non-
identity problem may not be grounded in the harm they do, but rather in the fact that 
these acts wrong the person or people who will exist. Harm is assessed by the 
outcome of an act, but an act itself may be wrong without doing harm, and it is the 
wrong done to the future person which makes the act morally impermissible 
(Woodward, 818). James Woodward illustrates this distinction between harming a 
person and wronging a person through an example of a black man who is denied a 
plane ticket by a racist airline. The flight the man wanted to buy a ticket for crashes 
and everyone onboard is killed. By Parfit’s standard of harm, the man is no worse off 
than he would have otherwise been. The man would have otherwise been killed, so he 
has not been harmed by the airline’s actions (Woodward, 811). However, Woodward 
points out that the moral impermissibility of that act does not come from harm, i.e., 
setting the man’s interests back, according to what they would have otherwise been, 
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but, instead, the act is impermissible because of the wrong done to the man, and that 
wrong is why the act is impermissible. Regardless of the outcome, and regardless of 
harm, the man had a right to choose to buy a plane ticket and not be discriminated 
against based on prejudice. This right was violated and through the violation of his 
rights, this man was wronged, regardless of the avoidance of harm which was 
technically the outcome of the act (Woodward, 811). 
           Parfit responds to Woodward by arguing that once a person realizes what they 
have gained, by the acts in non-identity cases (i.e. a life worth living), a person will 
waive their right to the alternative. For example, consider a case in which a person is 
unconscious and needs to have their arm amputated or they will die. Parfit argues that 
although the unconscious person may have a right to bodily autonomy, they will 
waive their right to consenting to the amputation because the alternative is worse for 
that person (Parfit, 855). 
The problem with this response, however, is that Parfit is equivocating 
between harming and wronging by considering only the consequences of the act in 
order to ascertain harm, rather than considering the act itself, in order to ascertain 
wrong (Woodward, 823). We wrong someone when we violate their rights 
(Woodward, 823). There may be cases in which someone may consent to a violation 
of their rights, but this does not always justify the wrong done (Woodward, 823). A 
person’s consent depends on their personal interest. Someone might have an interest 
in a certain outcome, but that might be at the expense of their being wronged and 
these remain two separate issues. Consider the man who was denied an airline ticket. 
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He may have had an interest in living which would make him feel grateful that the 
outcome of the airline’s act was that he was not on the flight which crashed. 
However, this lucky outcome, the lack of harm done, does not negate the fact that his 
right to buy a plane ticket was violated and based on that act, he was wronged by the 
airline (Woodward, 811). The harm done to a person is distinct from the wrong done. 
The example such as the amputation example, which Parfit poses, also overlooks the 
difference between non-identity cases and examples a violation of rights in which the 
person already exists and would be identical in the alternative outcome. There is a 
stark difference between the alternative to a person waiving their right to something 
being death and the alternative being non-existence. Death means missing out on 
something that a person had gotten to know and in most cases, had enjoyed at some 
points, that being life. Non-existence however does not come with any loss. 
        The non-identity problem is a narrow person-affecting problem. There is 
wrong done to a particular person. In order to assess why the act which led to this 
harm is impermissible, it should be explained in terms of why that particular person is 
wronged, otherwise, we are not necessarily deeming an act as wrong, but rather we 
are simply deeming one type of existence to be preferable. Consider the slave child 
example. Once that child has been brought into existence and has a life barely worth 
living, but worth living nonetheless, as a slave, a solution to the non-identity problem 
should be able to tell us why that particular child has been wronged. This is because 
regardless of whether that particular child enjoys the benefits of a life worth living, 
she is also the one who is enduring the burdens of being a slave. The alternative 
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group of people who could have existed, whom wide-person-affecting and impersonal 
solutions take into account, are not affected by these burdens. They don’t exist. The 
particular person who has been forced to actually exist in these circumstances is the 
person affected by the act. 
 
Elizabeth Harman and Changing How We Define Harm: 
        Elizabeth Harman offers an alternative solution to the non-identity problem 
which involves changing how we define harm and using her new standard of harm. 
Harman argues that her solution is in fact narrow-person-affecting, which sounds 
promising, but I argue that in actuality, due to the steps Harman takes in order to 
deem which types of harms may be permissible, her solution is actually wide-person 
affecting and is similarly as ineffective as Derek Parfit’s. Harman argues that we are 
approaching the concept of harm incorrectly, when evaluating scenarios in which the 
non-identity problem arises (Harman, 107). Harman argues that we make a mistake in 
stating that a necessary condition of harm is: “an action harms a person only if it 
makes the person worse than she otherwise would have been if the action had not 
been performed” (Harman, 107). Harman is unsatisfied with this standard of harm 
and argues that the correct way to evaluate harm is as a sufficient condition. 
Harman’s proposed account is that “an action harms a person if the action causes 
pain, early death, bodily damage, or deformity to her, even if she would not have 
existed if the action had not been performed” (Harman, 108). I will refer to this as 
Harman’s Harm Threshold. Harman then assesses the moral wronging in cases of the 
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non-identity problem by considering whether someone has been harmed according to 
this new standard of harm and weighing the harm against any benefits to determine 
whether that harm is permissible. Harman feels the need to use an alternative 
definition of harm in solving the non-identity problem because her approach involves 
not only deciding whether an act is harmful, but beyond that, she explains why certain 
harms are impermissible while others are not. Harman argues that knowing whether 
an act is harmful does require an analysis. Rather, she believes that the definition of 
harm she applies captures “clear cases of harm” (Harman, 92). Solving the non-
identity problem is not a question of whether an act is harmful, but instead, of 
whether that harm is permissible or not. Therefore, we begin a solution by evaluating 
harm as a sufficient condition, and from there we assess whether that harm is 
permissible or not. 
        Harman’s solution to the non-identity problem involves first, redefining harm, 
and second, distinguishing between when harm is permissible and when it is not. 
Harman argues that here are scenarios in which harm occurs, but we describe them as 
not being harmful as a way of explaining the permissibility of the action, regardless 
of the harm (Harman, 91). Instead of distinguishing between whether or not someone 
is harmed, we should be discussing whether that harm is permissible, depending on 
the reasons for or against it (Harman, 91). Harman’s new definition of harm expands 
the kinds of acts which constitute harm, but this does not mean all of these acts are 
immediately impermissible. We determine what makes a harmful act permissible or 
impermissible based on whether our reasons to perform the act are stronger or weaker 
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than our reasons not to perform the act.  For example, Harman uses the example of a 
surgeon who removes someone’s swollen appendix by cutting a hole in their 
abdomen (Harman, 91). By Harman’s Harm Threshold, the surgeon’s action harms 
the patient. They cause bodily damage or pain. However, we need to go one step 
further to determine the moral permissibility of the harmful action by considering the 
reasons in favor of or against the action. Causing this harm is a reason against the 
action, however it is outweighed by the reasons in favor of the action. These reasons 
include the fact that the patient would suffer even more greatly and would even die if 
not for the surgery. Because these reasons in favor of the surgery outweigh the reason 
against it, the harmful act is permissible (Harman, 91). 
        Harman applies her assessment of harm to Derek Parfit’s radioactive waste 
policy example in order to explain how she uses this standard of harm and assessment 
of impermissible versus permissible harm, in order to solve the non-identity problem. 
Intuitively, we want to be able to say that “it is wrong to adopt the [Radioactive 
Waste Policy (RWP)] because of the harm to the future individuals who will suffer” 
(Harman, 92). Via Harman’s Harm Threshold, which states that an act is harmful if it 
causes early death, we know that adopting RWP is harmful. Now, we must weigh the 
reasons for and against adopting the policy in order to determine if it is actually 
impermissible. Harman considers the reasons in favor of adopting RWP. These 
reasons include that 1) the future individuals who will exist if we do choose the 
policy will enjoy benefits throughout their lives, and 2) if we do not adopt the policy 
then we, the current people, will be inconvenienced (Harman, 92). Now we must 
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weigh these reasons against the reasons we have in favor of not adopting RWP. These 
reasons include 1) that if we do not adopt the policy, the individuals who will exist if 
we choose the Safe Policy will enjoy benefits throughout their lives and 2) if we do 
adopt the policy, the individuals who will exist will be harmed (Harman, 93). Both 
groups who exist will benefit, but the harm that will occur to the group that will exist 
should we adopt RWP is a stronger reason to not adopt the policy than the 
inconvenience is a reason to adopt it. Therefore, the harm inflicted by adopting RWP 
is not permissible and we should not adopt the policy (Harman, 93). Notice that the 
application of Harman’s solution has three elements: Harman’s Harm Threshold 
which determines if the act is harmful, the argument that “reasons against harm are so 
morally serious t Therefore, the types of acts, such as choosing RWP in issues in 
which the Non-Identity Problem arises are morally impermissible because the 
harming action is wrong when there is “an alternative in which parallel benefits can 
be provided without parallel harms (Harman, 93).            
Harman applies her solution to the case of the fourteen-year-old mother which 
Parfit poses. In that case, because the fourteen-year-old has the alternative option of 
having a child later, she has the option to provide “parallel benefits without parallel 
harms” and this is why the fourteen-year-old conceiving a child is wrong (Harman, 
95). 
I have two primary objections to Harman’s solution to the non-identity 
problem, one of which can be illustrated by considering how her solution attempts to 
answer this example. My first objection to Harman’s solution lies in it being a wide-
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person-affecting solution to a narrow-person affecting problem. This objection 
requires more of an explanation than it did to Parfit’s solution however, because 
Harman argues that she has provided a solution that explains the moral 
impermissibility of these acts “in virtue of harming the very future individuals whose 
existence is dependent on” that act (Harman, 90). Harman believes her solution is 
narrow-person affecting, but in fact, her solution requires us to do an act which is best 
for future people in general, making it a wide-person-affecting solution. The reason 
Harman believes her solution is narrow-person-affecting is because in her definition 
of harm, she explains harm in virtue of the particular person harmed. However, this is 
not her whole solution. The solution she provides for the non-identity problem 
explains the impermissibility of this harm through wide-person-affecting reasoning. 
By considering the benefits to the future people who would exist in each available 
act, Harman expands the scope of her solution to be wide-person-affecting. She 
argues that the fourteen-year-old mother conceiving a child is wrong because she had 
the option of having a non-identical child who would be better off than the child who 
would be conceived when the mother is fourteen. 
Harman also makes the mistake of considering the benefits to merely possible 
people in her solution. In her paper, “Existence:  Who Needs it? The Non-Identity 
Problem and Merely Possible People,” Rivka Weinberg discusses this type of mistake 
of considering benefits to merely possibly people. Weinberg argues that it is 
nonsensical to consider the interests of someone who will never exist because 
interests only begin with existence. She states, “it makes little sense to worry about 
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depriving merely possible people of the benefits of life since there is no real subject 
for that deprivation” (Weinberg, 2012, 3). Harman commits exactly this error by 
including the benefits which the merely possible child who would have existed had 
the fourteen-year-old mother waited to conceive, would have had in her solution to 
the non-identity problem. Harman’s solution compares two groups of people, one of 
which is a group of merely possible people, and explains the moral impermissibility 
of an act based on why we should have chosen the act that would be better for future 
people in general. 
Consider how Harman approaches the radioactive waste policy example. She 
weighs the harms and benefits of two groups of people: the group of people that will 
exist if we choose the policy, and the group that will not exist. I argue that there is no 
additional information we gain by considering how our actions affect persons who 
will not exist because they have no moral value; therefore, by weighing their possible 
benefits into our decision of whether an act is morally permissible, we’ve gained no 
new insight. We might consider this additional information relevant because our 
actions might be judged against the alternative action available to us, but this 
information still remains irrelevant to solving the non-identity problem. That 
additional information tells us why another option might be better, but it does not 
explain the impermissibility of the acts in question, especially not in virtue of the 
people who are affected by these acts. The only persons whose harm I would think to 
consider would be those who would be harmed by the action which brought them into 
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existence. The benefits that the persons who would not exist would have, were they 
too exist, are irrelevant. 
Finally, Harman’s solution is insufficient because it is too narrow to include 
some types of harm which we would intuitively want to categorize as being 
impermissible. For example, consider cases in which someone commits an intuitively 
morally impermissible act to an unconscious victim. The act leaves no physical pain, 
does not inflict bodily damage or deformity, nor does it cause early death. Further, 
because the victim was unconscious, there is not emotional trauma, a different type of 
pain. An example of this type of act is unconsented physical touching of an 
unconscious victim. When the victim regains consciousness, they have no physical 
pain to allow them to understand that they have been harmed. Nor do they recall the 
instance, so they have no emotional pain. By Harman’s standards, this person has not 
experienced harm so we cannot assess the moral impermissibility of their assailants 
act by using her solution. Harm, by Harman’s definition has not occurred here. 
Instead, there is a violation of rights that has occurred, in the violating of the victim’s 
bodily autonomy and the neglect of her consent, and regardless of whether she finds 
herself to be benefited in some way, and regardless of whether the type of harm falls 
into the categories which Harman provides. The act is morally impermissible on the 
grounds that it has wronged the victim and violated her rights. However, Harman’s 
solution provides us no method for addressing this type of violation and is therefore 
insufficient for explaining the moral impermissibility of acts that we find intuitively 
impermissible. 
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McBrayer and the Impersonal Duty Based Approach: 
        Justin Patrick McBrayer argues in favor of an impersonal duty-based solution 
to the non-identity problem. An impersonal ethics necessitates doing the action which 
will bring about the best states of affairs (McBrayer, 300). According to McBrayer’s 
impersonal duty based approach to assessing why non-identity acts are impermissible, 
potential parents have an impersonal duty to bring about, or avoid certain 
consequences for their potential child (McBrayer, 300). On McBrayer’s view, the 
wrongness of an action comes from violating this duty by “introducing an avoidable 
amount of suffering and evil into the world” (McBrayer, 300). However, McBrayer’s 
solution also includes considering the context of the act which breaches this duty, so 
that not all procreation is necessarily always wrong. In making a moral assessment 
based on McBrayer’s impersonal duty based solution, McBrayer also requires that we 
consider the specific context of the reproductive scenario of which we are assessing 
the moral permissibility. Considering the context of the scenario means considering 
the specific details of that scenario such as what the other options available to the 
reproducers are. For a reproducer’s act to be morally wrong, they must have had and 
forgone the option to act in “an alternative fashion …without imposing substantial 
burdens or costs on himself or others” (McBrayer, 304). Therefore, there are two 
elements to the impersonal duty based approach: our impersonal duty to minimize 
suffering, and a consideration of the alternative options available to the agent who is 
making the reproductive choice. 
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The example which McBrayer offers which I believe exemplifies his 
impersonal duty based and context considering approach is that of a man and a 
woman who suffer from Down’s syndrome deciding if they should have a child. 
Knowing that there is a strong likelihood that any child they conceive will inherit a 
similar disability, they conceive and raise a child who has Down’s syndrome 
(McBrayer, 305). In this case, McBrayer argues that according to his approach, since 
there was no alternative action available to the parents, aside from having to remain 
childless, if we consider this context, it is clear that the parents’ decision is 
permissible. In this case, the parents suffering of not being able to have a child would 
outweigh the suffering of the child to live with Down’s syndrome. 
Let us consider how McBrayer’s solution would apply to one of our earlier 
examples in which we see the non-identity problem arise. If we apply McBrayer’s 
impersonal duty-based analysis of why some reproductive acts are impermissible, we 
choose the Safe Policy in Parfit’s radioactive waste policy example because that 
policy leads to less foreseeable suffering being brought into the world than the risky 
policy does. By choosing this policy, we abide by our impersonal duty to reduce the 
amount of suffering we introduce into the world. This is because foreseeably, the 
group of people who will exist should we choose the Safe Policy will suffer less than 
those who will exist should we choose the Risky Policy due to those who will exist 
due to the Risky Policy dying early due to the nuclear waste having been disposed of 
improperly. 
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        I disagree with this duty based approach because of its consequentialist nature, 
which causes it to run into all of the problems which are common to 
consequentialism. First, there is the problem of foreseeability. We cannot know that 
we will necessarily minimize suffering on a bigger scale by conceiving or not 
conceiving some child. Consider the child who is born with congenital amputation. 
This is the case where someone is born with no limbs. However, that person lives a 
fulfilling life, even becomes a successful marathon runner, and becomes an 
inspiration to athletes everywhere. No matter how much individual pain this person 
might endure, to say that there is an impersonal increase in suffering due to their 
birth, is presumptuous and unfounded. There is an individual who is suffering, but the 
effect it has on the world in general seems to be positive. The problem with this 
approach is similar to the problem with both Parfit and Harman’s approach: it is a 
wide-person-affecting, in this case an impersonal solution, to a narrow-person 
affecting problem. A solution to the non-identity problem should be narrow-person 
affecting because it is that particular person who is born into the apparent harm and a 
consequentialist view negates any individual suffering and focuses on the state of 
affairs, which may have, in many cases, a huge potential for good. Therefore, an 
impersonal solution will be unable to address the non-identity cases that don’t appear 
to reduce overall happiness. 
        Besides its foundational theoretical problems, I argue that McBrayer’s 
impersonal duty based approach does not consider the child who will come into 
existence, but rather puts the parents first. In order to understand how his solution 
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does this, let us return to the example he provides of why the parents who know their 
child will have Down’s syndrome are not morally wrong. First, recall McBrayer’s 
consideration of the context of the scenario and his assessment that the parents only 
other option was to not have a child at all. This is simply not the case. I believe that 
McBrayer neglects to mention this option because for some people, having a child 
who is biologically related to them is a significant part of their desire to have a child. 
The parents did have the option to adopt, they simply wanted to have a child 
biologically related to them, McBrayer has asked us to disregard the option of 
adoption due to the parents’ preference, rather than consideration of the child who 
will be forced into existence. McBrayer’s solution comes down to a question of 
whether not having a child, or adopting a child, is worse than living with Down’s 
syndrome and McBrayer’s solution seems to benefit the parents by indulging their 
desire for a child rather than considering the child as a person in themselves who will 
actually be directly affected by this indulgence. 
        Beyond this, I believe that McBrayer’s duty based approach helps itself to 
more than its impersonal foundation allows in considering context and this leads to a 
pure case by case solution to the non-identity problem rather than a solution. An 
impersonal account is simply incompatible with the consideration of case by case 
context. If we have an impersonal duty to do a certain act, then exceptions should not 
be made due to specific, or special, circumstances. If we have a duty to minimize 
suffering, and we believe that having a child who will be born without limbs would 
fall into the category of suffering, then regardless of the context of the situation, such 
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as that being the only option available, our duty remains and our having that child 
would be wrong. If an act is wrong because we have a duty to minimize the amount 
of suffering we bring into the world, then our duty to minimize that suffering does not 
end once it has a negative effect on our own happiness. By helping himself to the 
ability to consider each case and its details individually, McBrayer negates the 
impersonal foundation which he began with and is essentially just weighing the cost 
of the suffering against the benefits of existence on a case by case basis, which 
doesn’t solve the non-identity problem as a whole at all. This is because it does not 
explain the impermissibility of the acts committed, it simply provides reasons for why 
some circumstances make these otherwise intuitively immoral acts morally 
permissible. This case-by-case style of addressing these scenarios does not address 
the non-identity problem because many non-identity cases do not involve more 
overall costs than benefits. The victims have lives that are worth living, by the nature 
of the non-identity problem. 
 
Conclusion 
Each of these three approaches to solving the non-identity problem falls short 
of actually solving the non-identity problem, be it Parfit’s Principle Q, Harman’s 
wide person affecting assessment of harm, or McBrayer’s impersonal duty based 
approach. Each of them provides some reason why it seems better to choose the 
option which ends up with the person or group of people who seem better off, but 
they don’t tell us why any of the acts in the three scenarios I mentioned are actually 
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morally impermissible. For example consider how these approaches solve the RWP 
example. For every solution posed, choosing the Safe Policy is better because a group 
of people will exist who will suffer less than those who would exist if we chose the 
Risky Policy. In the fourteen-year old mother case, each solution tells us the mother 
should wait to conceive in order to conceive a child who will suffer less. Finally, in 
the slave child example, Parfit’s Principle Q cannot even fully address this case 
because a different number of people will exist, one slave child compared to zero free 
children. Harman’s Harm Threshold, first, does not clearly address a lack of liberty as 
a harm, and beyond that, her weighing of reasons would possibly lead to the child’s 
conception being permissible due to the benefits the child would receive from a life 
worth living. McBrayer’s impersonal solution tells us the child should not be 
conceived because the parents are breaching their duty to not introduce avoidable 
suffering into the world. 
None of the solutions explored in this chapter are able to tell us why these acts 
are bad for the person they actually affect. In the next section, I will address James 
Woodward and Gregory Kavka’s approaches to solving the non-identity problem, and 
explain why those accounts better address the actual moral wrong present in the three 
scenarios through their consideration of the rights of current and future people and 
their proposal that an act can wrong a person without actually harming them. 
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Chapter 2: Reframing the Non-Identity Problem in Order to Solve It 
 
Introduction 
Unlike Parfit, McBrayer, and Harman, James Woodward and Gregory Kavka 
do not approach the non-identity problem by considering harm done. Rather, 
Woodward and Kavka accept that the persons in non-identity cases have not been 
harmed, but instead they have been wronged through some violation of their rights as 
will be argued in this chapter. Both of these accounts of wronging someone without 
harming them are narrow-person affecting solutions. They account for the wrong 
done to a particular person in which to wrong someone means to violate a right that 
they have. By explaining the moral impermissibility of the types of acts which give 
rise to the non-identity problem through how they wrong someone rather than how 
they harm someone, and explaining that wrong in virtue of the wrong done to the 
particular person, Woodward and Kavka have provided a substantially more 
successful answer to the non-identity problem than other attempts. 
 
Woodward on Wronging without Harming 
        Woodward’s solution to the non-identity problem is based on his rejection of 
the premise which he believes is most crucial to Derek Parfit’s no worse-off 
argument, which he calls premise N. Premise N states that, 
“an action, A, performed by X, cannot wrong person P and cannot be objectionable 
because of bad effects it has on P if P is not worse off as a result of A than he would 
be under any alternative action which could be performed by X. Nor in these 
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circumstances can A violate an obligation owed to P, or a right possessed by P” 
(Woodward, 808). 
 
Counter to this premise, Woodward argues that persons have interests besides their 
well-being or how well off they are, overall, after an act, and that actions, not just 
states of affairs matter when assessing the morality of an act (Woodward, 809). 
Parfit’s approach merely looks at the outcome of an act and is therefore too 
consequentialist for a consideration of the non-identity problem because regardless of 
whether our interests are set back, a right can be violated and that violation explains 
the moral impermissibility of a certain act even if the victim is not necessarily worse 
off. In order to illustrate this distinction between wronging and harming and therefore 
demonstrate how a person can be wronged even if they are not harmed, Woodward 
lays out three examples. 
        First, Woodward considers a situation of racism. Smith, who is African-
American, attempts to purchase an airline ticket for some flight. The airline is racist 
though, and because Smith is black, the airline refuses to sell him a plane ticket. 
However, the flight for which Smith wanted the ticket crashes, killing everyone 
aboard (Woodward, 810). Had Smith been aboard that flight, he would have also been 
killed. Because the airline refused to sell Smith a ticket for that flight, he was not on 
the flight and instead survived. Smith has not been harmed in that he is no worse off 
than he would be if the airline had sold him a ticket; in fact, he is better off. However, 
regardless, we would not consider the airline’s act to be morally permissible. This is 
because when assessing the act, we consider something besides the harm done. Smith 
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was not harmed, but he was wronged. His rights were violated by having service 
refused on the basis of racism. 
        Another example which illustrates how someone may not be worse off after 
an act, but may still have their rights violated by that act, is the real-life example of 
Victor Frankl’s experience in a Nazi concentration camp. In his memoir, “Man’s 
Search for Meaning,” Frankl states that through his experience in this concentration 
camp he, “developed certain resources of character, insights into the human 
condition, and capacities for appreciation that he might not have otherwise had” 
(Woodward, 809). Woodward considers that perhaps, the treatment of Frankl by the 
Nazi’s was a “necessary condition for the richness of his later life” (Woodward, 809). 
If we only assess the Nazi’s actions based on how well off Frankl is afterward, then 
we would have to say that the Nazi’s actions were morally permissible, but this is 
horrifyingly counterintuitive, and for good reason. Regardless of Frankl considering 
himself to be better off by having gained these perspectives because of his 
experience, him being subject to this experience in the first place was a tremendous 
violation of his rights and the Nazi’s actions were morally impermissible. Even if the 
outcome of their act had a positive effect on their victim, the act itself was morally 
impermissible regardless. 
        Finally, Woodward discusses an example originally posed by Derek Parfit, in 
which wronging without harming occurs which is more similar to the non-identity 
problem. A fourteen-year-old girl decides to have a child. According to Parfit, we can 
only say that it would have been better for her to have waited, not due to anything 
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done to her child, but due to, “what she could have done for any child she would have 
had when she was mature” (Parfit, 364). In this case, Woodward argues that, even if 
the child has a life worth living and is therefore not harmed, parents still have duties 
and obligations to “treat for and care for their children in certain ways” (Woodward, 
815). Woodward compares the fourteen-year-old having this child when she is not 
mature enough to fulfill her obligations to the child, to making a promise knowing 
that you will not be able to keep it (Woodward, 815). The child is not harmed, but the 
mother did an act which includes an obligation she will be unable to fulfill, such as 
having the material and emotional capacity to care for the child. Therefore, that act is 
morally impermissible on the grounds of the wrong done to the child, the wrong 
being the mother’s neglect to fulfill her obligation to the child. 
        Now, we should consider how we can apply Woodward’s solution to the three 
examples utilized in chapter one, in order to examine how we can understand the 
moral impermissibility of those specific acts. First, I will apply Woodward’s 
wronging without harming solution to the radioactive waste policy example. 
According to Woodward’s solution, we would be able to ground the moral 
impermissibility in choosing the radioactive waste policy over the safe policy in the 
violation of the future people’s right to their bodily health. Regarding the case of the 
slave child, the parents are violating the child’s right to autonomy in taking away his 
liberty. Finally, the fourteen-year-old mother has brought a child into the world to 
whom she has obligations which she is unable to fulfill. In each of those cases, 
though the individual or group is not harmed in the sense that they are no worse off 
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than they would have otherwise been, they have either had some right violated or the 
fulfillment of some obligation denied, and that is where the moral impermissibility of 
the acts lie. 
        Parfit responds to Woodward’s solution to the non-identity problem by 
discussing the particular way that rights and consent apply in non-identity cases, 
cases in which the person who these rights apply to and who can consent to them 
being violated, does not actually exist. In some non-identity cases, Parfit points out 
that one cannot violate a right that a person never had. In the case of a person who 
will only ever exist under certain circumstances, there are certain rights these persons 
never could have had fulfilled (Parfit, 364). For example, in the case of the child of 
the fourteen-year-old mother, if that child were to argue that her right to a good start 
in life was violated, Parfit thinks it is important to realize that she never had access to 
this right in the first place (Parfit, 364). The fourteen-year-old could have never had 
that particular child had she waited. 
Further, regarding rights that the person could have had, Parfit argues that 
once the person who comes into existence realizes that they have gained something, 
i.e. a life worth living, they would waive their right to the alternative, namely, 
nonexistence (Parfit, 839). He argues that it is possible to “be compensated in 
advance for any burden” (Parfit, 839). To make this point, Parfit uses the example of 
a surgeon who needs to cut off someone’s arm to save their life, but the person is 
unconscious, so the surgeon must act without first getting the consent of the person 
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she will be operating on (Parfit, 855). Clearly in this case, we would not want to have 
to say that the surgeon has wronged the person by acting in order to save their life. 
To this point Woodward responds that Parfit is equivocating between harm and 
wrong. Harm is dependent upon outcomes and wronging is dependent upon the act 
itself and the intention or motive behind the act. He argues that our rights exist to 
“protect highly specific interests” and if an act violates one of these interests, it is not 
enough of a defense of that act to simply argue that the act is not worse for us overall 
(Woodward, 809). Even if the person committing the act can foresee an overall 
benefit, that does not negate the wrong. There is still a rights violation being 
committed regardless of any beneficial end. We must consider the act and its 
intentions in order to assess a wrong. 
In their paper, “Whose Problem is Non-Identity?” Rivka Weinberg and Paul 
Hurley discuss the role that consent plays in these types of rights violations in which 
Parfit claims that we should consider some type of retroactive consent to be at play. 
This means that when we consider the wrong done by apparently harmful act, or an 
act which violates a right, we should consider whether the person would have 
consented to it (Parfit, 855). For example, if someone is lying unconscious on a busy 
road, Parfit would argue that even if we violate their right by touching them without 
their consent, our moving them would not be impermissible because we can rationally 
believe that they, were they to have the option, would rationally consent to being 
moved to avoid being run over by a car. 
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Weinberg and Hurley argue that such an appeal to consent does not apply in 
non-identity where there may be factors present which could potentially undermine 
an agent's ability to consent to an act. These factors include: an impairment in the 
agent's ability to rationalize, compromising their authority, and circumstances of 
vulnerability compromising the agent’s ability to exercise their autonomy (Hurley and 
Weinberg, 719).  The fact that an agent has consented to an act which violates their 
rights, or does not regret the occurrence of such an act, is not indicative of the 
wrongness of the act. In the case of the surgeon, it is not presumed consent which 
makes the actions of the surgeon permissible, it is the surgeon being motivated by a 
respect for the patient as an end in himself (Hurley and Weinberg, 727). This is a 
factor which we do not see in the case of Smith being denied the airline ticket, or in 
the case of Frankl’s imprisonment by the Nazi’s. In both of those cases, whether or 
not Smith or Frankl would have reasonably waived their rights due to their being 
better off due to the act, Smith in that he lived rather than dying in the plane crash, 
and Frankl in that he believed his character was formed by the horrors he endured at 
the hands of the Nazis, is irrelevant to the assessment of the wrong. The airline and 
the Nazis both neglected to treat their victims as ends in themselves. They did not 
respect them as persons. Therein lies the wrong, and the question of whether the 
victims would have consented to this treatment had they known the outcome, is 
completely beside the point. 
        Another objection that one might raise to Woodward’s solution is that in a 
discussion of rights, we also should consider the parent’s right to reproduce. For 
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example, consider an adjustment to the example of the fourteen-year old who wants 
to have a child in which that is the only chance that girl will ever have to have a child. 
If she waits until she is of a more capable age, she will no longer be able to conceive 
a child. If Woodward considers rights violations to be central to wronging someone, 
then perhaps we should consider the mother wronged if his solution to the non-
identity problem violates her right to have a child. 
        I would respond to this potential objection that even if we have a right that 
right does not extend to allow us to violate someone else’s right in order to retain our 
right. If the fourteen-year-old has a right to have a child, she still does not have the 
right to violate the obligations she would have to that child once it exists in order to 
fulfill her right. Her inability to conceive later, although unfortunate, is not a wrong 
anyone has done to her, but her having the child is her actively wronging the child. 
        Woodward’s solution is so successful because it assesses the morality of an 
act by considering the act itself, rather than some outcome beyond that. Persons 
should be held responsible for their actions themselves, not for the outcome of their 
actions and how lucky they happen to be in whether their actions have positive 
consequences. 
 
Kavka on the Modified Categorical Imperative and Reproductive Extortion 
        Gregory Kavka’s solution to the non-identity problem also grounds the 
impermissibility of non-identity problem inducing acts in how they wrong the person 
who is created. Kavka’s solution involves two elements: a modified categorical 
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imperative and a limitation on creating restricted lives. Kavka argues that an intuitive 
believe that leading a restricted life is undesirable underlies our intuitive reaction to 
these cases being wrong (Kavka, 105). We then can use the modified categorical 
imperative to explain why the people committing these acts have wronged those 
whom they produce to whose creation their actions lead. These acts wrong their 
victims because they treat them as a mere means to an end. They sentence those who 
will be created to these restricted lives in order to gain something they want, and 
justify this sentencing by claiming that they have provided the person who will exist 
with someone which they would have an interest in, that something being a life worth 
living (Kavka, 110). 
Kavka considers a restricted life to be a life that is “significantly deficient in 
one or more of the major respects that generally make human lives valuable and 
worth living” (Kavka, 105). Kavka’s modified categorical imperative, “forbids 
treating rational beings, or their creation as a means only, rather than as ends in 
themselves” (Kavka, 110). We commit reproductive extortion when we use someone 
or their creation as a mere means to an end through coercion by claiming we have 
provided them with a life worth living, something we assume they would want. 
Kavka describes how this applies to non-identity cases as being when parents, 
“exploit their unearned position of control over life for others to, in a sense, extort an 
unfair price for the exercise of those powers. But because the benefit they provide- 
life itself- is greater than the unearned price they exact, their actions do not appear 
immoral” (Kavka, 106). 
 
Through assessing the morality of reproductive acts with this modified categorical 
imperative we can explain why reproductive extortion is wrong and ground the moral 
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impermissibility of acts that give rise to the non-identity problem in how they extort 
the person or people who will exist. 
        Kavka illustrates how to apply the modified categorical imperative when we 
see this type of reproductive extortion through the slave child case which was 
discussed in chapter one. Consider again the parents who enter into a contract with a 
wealthy man. They will conceive a child and give him that child once it is born in 
exchange for 50,000 dollars. The parents are misusing their reproductive power, their 
ability to have a child. They are treating the child as a mere means of attaining 50,000 
dollars. Any benevolence towards the child, which Kavka believes is unlikely to be 
intended by the parents, is negated by this obvious act of extortion (Kavka, 101). 
        Now, we should consider how Kavka’s solution could be applied to the other 
two scenarios in which we saw the non-identity problem arise in chapter one: the case 
of the radioactive waste policy and the case of the fourteen-year-old girl having a 
child. First, I will address how the modified categorical imperative reveals the 
immorality of choosing the radioactive waste policy over the safe policy. The misuse 
of reproductive power here is more difficult to see at first because it is not as direct as 
the immediate effects an act has on a child who is born soon after the act. However, 
when we choose the radioactive waste policy, there is still a problem of a misuse of 
reproductive power. We know that policies shape where people will live, which 
affects who people will meet, which affects who and when they will conceive. Those 
who choose the radioactive waste policy are misusing their power to gain a more 
convenient lives for themselves, and intentionally creating lives of people who will 
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suffer as a result of that choice. The resulting persons’ lives are being used as a mere 
means to a more convenient end which violates the modified categorical imperative 
and is morally impermissible. 
        Finally, we can see how the modified categorical imperative solves the issue 
of the fourteen-year-old who wants to have a child. This girl is forcing the child into 
an agreement which, were it to have an alternative, it may not have agreed to. She is 
trading the child a life worth living under the circumstances of not having all of the 
obligations it is owed fulfilled. Once the child is born, it may not regret that it has a 
life worth living, but for the child to wish for a parent that could fulfill her obligations 
to that child would not be an unmerited complain. The mother wants to have a child 
at this moment in time in particular, and uses the creation of that particular child as a 
mere means to achieve that, neglecting to consider the burden she is imposing upon 
the child, she could easily wait to have a non-identical child. 
        One objection which could be made to Kavka’s solution is that nothing is 
actually wrong with the act itself, rather, the wrong is in the motivations or 
subsequent actions (Kavka, 101). First, the motivations of greed might actually be 
where the wrong lies, rather than in the act. The parents are acting selfishly and are 
being consumed by their own greed. Although it could be said that all procreation is 
selfish, there is a difference between traditional procreative selfishness and the 
selfishness which the parents in this scenario are acting upon. If the parents intended 
to have a child simply because they wanted a child, and intended to care for that child 
once it existed, as most potential parents do, they are not intending to continue acting 
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selfishly considering the immense amount of selflessness that comes with raising a 
child. In the slave child case on the other hand, the type of greed and selfishness that 
could cause us to think the motivation is what makes the act wrong is the pure, 
unchanging, intended selfishness. They are motivated by the monetary gain the child 
will bring, and fully intend to never act in the child’s interest. It could be said that this 
intention of greed is actually what we find intuitively wrong. Kavka responds to this 
objection by considering a modification to the parents’ motivations in the slave child 
example. He changes the slave child example so that, instead of using the money for 
themselves, the parents donate all of the money which they received in exchange for 
their child to charity (Kavka, 102). This was their intention from the beginning and 
they follow through with it. Even in this care, Kavka responds, our intuition remains 
that the act is wrong, and this is because even with good intentions toward another 
group of people, the parents do not have the right to condemn this child to slavery. 
Alternatively, regarding Kavka’s argument, it could be argued that it is 
actually the subsequent actions the creators take, not the initial act itself, which we 
find intuitively wrong. It is not the engaging in the contract, but the actual 
surrendering of the child once it is born which is morally impermissible because that 
violates a specific parental obligation to the child (Kavka, 101). Therefore, if the 
parents of the slave child were to enter into the agreement and once the child is born, 
they were to do everything in their power to release the child from the agreement, this 
would be admirable and the act itself would not matter, because once the child 
existed, they did attempt to care for it as best they could. Kavka responds to this that 
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because they had knowingly entered into the agreement with the belief that the child 
would be given to the slaveholder at its birth, they’re act is still wrong. Although they 
did their best once the child was born, they knew that this would not be good enough 
so any subsequent actions should not affect our judgement of the morality of the 
initial agreement (Kavka, 102). Additionally, this is not simply a possible person once 
the parents agree to the contract. It is a future person. This person will exist and will 
have future interests. Those interests exist once the parents make the decision to have 
the child, therefore the initial act is wrong, in addition to the subsequent act being 
wrong. Both acts violate the child’s rights. 
A third objection which could be made to Kavka’s solution is that the concept 
of a restricted life is too vague, therefore the requirement that we limit the creation of 
restricted lives is not motivating enough to be a part of a plausible solution. Although 
this apparent vagueness may seem to be harmful to Kavka’s solution, as long as we 
fully understand the role that this concept of a restricted life actually plays in Kavka’s 
solution, any vagueness that the term comes with is not an issue. Kavka uses the 
concept of a restricted life to explain our initial intuitive reaction and acknowledges 
that there could be a certain level of subjectivity within the term (Kavka, 104). 
However, the solution itself, does not rely on the subjective term for its explanatory 
power. Kavka’s solution for the non-identity problem is the modified categorical 
imperative, which simply restricts using a person or their creation as a means to an 
end. He does argue that we should limit the creation of restricted lives because we 
find the intentional creation of these types of lives, when we could create otherwise, 
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to be intuitively unappealing (Kavka, 104). However, this is not his reasoning for why 
the acts that give rise to the non-identity problem are objectively morally 
impermissible and therefore the vagueness of the term is not an issue. 
        I find Kavka’s solution to the non-identity problem to be the most successful 
of those discussed thus far. It grounds the moral impermissibility of the types of acts 
which lead to the non-identity problem in wronging, rather than harm and explains 
why some particular person is wronged. Beyond this however, it addresses any 
element in these cases which seems to distract us from the true moral wrong of the act 
by appearing to do some kind of good for the person affected by the act. For example, 
if the slave child, even has a slave, was provided with an incredibly lavish lifestyle, it 
is more difficult to see how his interests are not being met. However, Kavka’s 
solution explains how even if the victim in these cases seems to be benefited or have 
their interests met, the moral wrong of the act should still be clear. Even if the slave 
child believes his life is inarguably worth living, this benefit does not justify the 
wrong, rather, it exemplifies the form of reproductive extortion that is occurring. 
Kavka illustrates this type of extortion through the example of a tribe who is in a 
drought. Consider if every member of the tribe is suffering greatly and in dire need of 
water, and one member of the tribe finds water a copious source of water. That person 
does not reveal to anyone else that they have found this source, rather, they sell water 
at an excessively high price to whoever can afford to pay it (Kavka, 106). This is 
immoral extortion, and we can see how it is wrong regardless of the fact that the tribe 
members’ interests, of having their thirst quenched, is met. Similarly to this, for a 
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parent to misuse their reproductive power to gain something from the creation of a 
child, and to attempt to justify this by saying that they have provided that child with 
something which the child will value, a life worth living, is wrong regardless of any 
interest of the child met. This element of reproductive extortion which Kavka 
includes in his solution helps him to reach the most complete solution to the non-
identity problem thus far. 
This type of reproductive extortion is exactly the issue which Weinberg and 
Hurley discus as mentioned earlier. There appears to be consent on the side of the 
victim to a waiving of their rights, but in actuality, the issue of whether the victim 
would consent to the rights violation is irrelevant due to the manner of the 
presentation of the option of consent. The victim is placed in a situation that is 
wronging them, by the nature of the act committed, and is then expected to consent to 
such an action because doing so is, at that point, in his best interest (Hurley and 
Weinberg, 720). Weinberg and Hurley put the true nature of this type of consent in 
non-identity cases most honestly when they claim that the victim in these cases is 
presented with the choice of, “[their] life with a serious disability or [their] life” 
(Hurley and Weinberg, 720). This pseudo-choice is in no way a genuine portrayal of 
consent, but rather is the type of reproductive extortion which Kavka discusses. 
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How the Distinction between Harming and Wronging Dissolves the Non-Identity 
Problem 
        Beyond just solving the non-identity problem through explaining why the 
types of procreative acts which give rise to the problem are in fact morally 
impermissible, the harming versus wronging distinction shows us how we can 
dissolve the non-identity problem completely and avoid the paradox that Kavka 
initially set up. In his initial presentation of the non-identity problem, Derek Parfit 
approaches the problem from a staunchly teleological perspective. He is so troubled 
by our inability to demonstrate the wrong in non-identity cases because of the fact 
that the apparent victim is not worse off, and is in some cases, even better off than 
they would have otherwise been. However, this focus on outcomes distracts us from 
how solvable the problem actually is when we approach is from a deontological 
standpoint and consider what Hurley and Weinberg refer to as second personal 
        A person’s second personal interests refer to our interests in how we are 
treated by other people, our interpersonal relationships (Hurley and Weinberg, 706). 
Regardless of how a situation turns out, we have an interest in being treated as ends in 
ourselves rather than as mere means. It is this second-personal interest that we see 
being violated in non-identity cases. When we reframe the non-identity problem in 
order to consider it from a deontological rather than teleological perspective, as 
Woodward, Kavka, Hurley, and Weinberg all successfully do, we are able to solve 
the non-identity problem by easily addressing how the types of acts in which it arises 
are morally impermissible. 
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